Rationality, eros, and daemonic influence in the Platonic Theages and the Academy of Polemo and Crates by Lampe, KW
                          Lampe, K. W. (2013). Rationality, eros, and daemonic influence in the
Platonic Theages and the Academy of Polemo and Crates. American Journal
of Philology, 134(3), 383-424. 10.1353/ajp.2013.0033
Link to published version (if available):
10.1353/ajp.2013.0033
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms.html
Take down policy
Explore Bristol Research is a digital archive and the intention is that deposited content should not be
removed. However, if you believe that this version of the work breaches copyright law please contact
open-access@bristol.ac.uk and include the following information in your message:
• Your contact details
• Bibliographic details for the item, including a URL
• An outline of the nature of the complaint
On receipt of your message the Open Access Team will immediately investigate your claim, make an
initial judgement of the validity of the claim and, where appropriate, withdraw the item in question
from public view.
 
1 
Forthcoming in The American Journal of Philology (2013) 
Abstract:  
Scholars have always been troubled by the important role ascribed to erotic intimacy and 
demonic influence in the discussion of Socratic education in the pseudo-Platonic 
Theages. They have accordingly described this dialogue’s educational model as 
mysterious, superstitious, and irrational. In this article I argue that the Theages’ portrayal 
of both erotics and demonic power is compatible with cooperative rational inquiry as 
described in genuine Platonic dialogues. I show that there are strong clues that the 
Theages’ erotics should be read against the backdrop of the speech of Diotima in the 
Symposium, while its demonology should be read against both the Symposium and the 
midwifery passage of the Theaetetus. Furthermore, these intertexts suggest that the most 
troublingly un-Socratic part of the Theages—the story of Aristides—should be read as a 
cautionary tale, not a straightforward representation of properly functioning education. 
Finally, since the Academy of Polemo and Crates has been plausibly identified as the 
origin of the Theages, I observe that recent research on this period assumes the same 
incompatibility between erotic intimacy, demonic influence, and cooperative rational 
inquiry as scholarship on the Theages. Yet the fragmentary evidence for this period does 
not justify this assumption. I therefore suggest we revise our understanding of “rational” 
education and inquiry in both this dialogue and the Old Academy from which it probably 
derives.    
 
Rationality, Eros, and Daemonic Influence in the Platonic Theages  
and the Academy of Polemo and Crates 
 Joyal opens his introduction to the Theages with the observation that “scholars 
have made the question of the dialogue’s authenticity almost the exclusive focus of their 
endeavours and have thereby been led to ignore what should be of primary importance, 
namely the detailed interpretation of the work from beginning to end.”1 Joyal’s 
commentary of 2000, which was joined by Bailly’s in 2004, effectively addresses this 
neglect by patiently tracing the movement of thought within the dialogue. Yet these 
commentators remain troubled by one of the elements which has always motivated debate 
about its authorship, namely its conclusion. Here Socrates issues a double warning to his 
                                                
1 Joyal 2000, 9. 
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would-be pupil Theages: first, he himself possesses no learning, though he excels in his 
understanding of eros; second, the daimonion and “the god” bear responsibility for his 
pupils’ progress, which appears to depend on physical proximity and bodily contact. It is 
this combination of erotics, divine intervention, and tactile influence which leads Pavlu to 
speak of “Wunderglauben an einen Zauberer Sokrates,” drives Vlastos to athetize the 
Theages “as a monument to the credulity to which some of Socrates’ superstitious 
admirers could sink after his death,” and most recently has led Tarrant to assign the 
Theages to the Academy of Polemo and Crates (ca. 314-260 BCE).2 Joyal pinpoints 
elements of this same combination as “what is unsatisfactory about this dialogue,” and 
Bailly calls them “too long and too sensational” and “so mysterious as to be utterly 
frustrating.”3 In short, displacing the question of authorship from the center of the 
interpretive agenda has not cast much light on the thinking behind the Theages’ 
conclusion. 
 My primary aim in this article is to propose an interpretation of this enigmatic 
passage and its relation to the rest of the dialogue. The core of my proposal is nothing 
revolutionary: it is that we should understand the Theages in the light of the other 
Platonic dialogues to which it conspicuously alludes, most important of which are the 
Symposium and the Theaetetus.4 The conclusion toward which these allusions point is 
that, while the Theages accentuates the role of eros and the daemonic in Socratic 
education, it does not thereby eliminate the role of cooperative reasoning. To the 
                                                
2 Pavlu 1909, 24; Vlastos 1991, 282; Tarrant 2005, 131-55. See also Janell 1901, 429-31; 
Souilhé 1930, 129-32. 
3 Joyal 2000, 53; Bailly 2004, 27.  
4 In this respect the Theages resembles the Clitophon, for example, which most scholars 
believe should be read before, alongside, or after the Republic. See most recently Bowe 
2007, 245-64; and Zuckert 2009, 332-6. 
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contrary, cooperative reasoning subsumes the influence of erotic impulses and daemonic 
agencies. Understanding the Theages in this way saves us from positing an author who, 
though he constantly and conspicuously engages with Platonic dialogues, somehow 
believes that Socrates’ commitment to rational inquiry is just window-dressing for 
magico-religious emanations. It is more plausible that he takes the pervasive religious 
language of Plato’s characters seriously, but combines his heightened sense of Socratic 
religiosity with Socratic reasoning.5 
  There are two reasons the Theages has not usually been read this way. The first is 
that despite finding the story Socrates tells to exemplify his educational powers very 
surprising, scholars have not considered that parts of it may be ironic. Yet I will argue 
that several clues in the dialogue suggest we are supposed to reflect critically on this 
story. The second is that many are hesitant to believe that the Theages’ author could 
assign so much importance to daemonic intervention, but remain committed to rational 
inquiry. Yet I will argue that this is not only compatible with Greek ways of thinking 
about divine agency in general, but also with many passages in Plato’s dialogues in 
particular. 
 I will not attempt to determine the Theages’ authorship in this article, though I 
share the common opinion that it was written by an Academic author working some time 
in the century after Plato.6 This assumption is validated by the Theages’ extensive 
                                                
5 Regarding Socratic “piety” or “religion,” see especially Morgan 1990, McPherran 1996, 
Bussanich 2006, and Vlastos 1991, 157-78.  
6 For comprehensive overviews of the scholarship on the dialogue’s authenticity, see 
Joyal 2000, 122-57; Bailly 2004, 49-71. An important supplement to these two is M. 
Joyal 2002, which establishes a terminus ante quem in the early second century BCE. 
Most recently, see Tarrant 2005.  
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references to Plato’s early and middle dialogues and similarity to the Alcibiades,7 which I 
discuss below. Further specifying the authorship would require detailed arguments about 
the direction of influence in these references and about the characteristic style and beliefs 
of potential authors. If I intended fully to assess Tarrant’s ascription of the dialogue to 
someone in the Academy of Polemo or Crates, I would also want to consider his detailed 
arguments about the terminology of Socratic education in the Theages and elsewhere. 
These tasks lie beyond the scope of this article. However, one element of Tarrant’s 
position will lend itself to revision in the light of my findings. His depiction of 
philosophical education under Polemo and Crates shares the unhelpful 
compartmentalization of eros and divine intervention against which I argue in my 
interpretation of the Theages. My criticisms will therefore not undermine Tarrant’s 
ascription of the dialogue, which I find plausible (though far from certain). If anything, 
they will tend to corroborate it, inasmuch as I will argue we can conceive of the interplay 
of eros, daemonic influence, and reasoning under Polemo and Crates along the same lines 
I establish for the Theages.  
1. Initial Summary of the Dialogue 
 In order for the debate about the conclusion of the Theages to be intelligible, I 
must begin by offering a summary of the dialogue’s dramatic framework, conversational 
topics, and investigatory or protreptic agenda. In the process I will also mention those 
parallel Platonic texts which can help us to reconstruct that agenda.8 Of course this 
                                                
7 By (Plato’s) Alcibiades in this article I always mean the Greater Alcibiades. Regarding 
its authorship and date of composition, see Denyer 2001, 14-26.   
8 For concise analyses of passages in other Platonic texts with which parts of the Theages 
are clearly in dialogue, see Pavlu 1909 and Bailly 2004, 265-84.  
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summary already constitutes an interpretation, but I will signpost the most controversial 
issues and defer their consideration until the following sections.9  
 The dialogue opens with Demodocus asking Socrates’ advice about the education 
of his son, Theages. Theages has conceived a desire “to become wise” (σοφὸς γενέσθαι, 
121d1), and is eager for his father to hire “one of those wise men” (τινὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν, 
121d5). Demodocus, who is a sort of rustic traditionalist, is afraid that his son will be 
“corrupted” by the wrong teacher (µὴ . . . διαφθαρῇ, 122a4-5). The dramatic framework 
of a father seeking the right way to educate his son immediately recalls Plato’s Laches. In 
case the reader fails to make this connection, the two youths requiring education in the 
Laches, Thucydides son of Melesias and Aristides son of Lysimachus, make important 
appearances at the end of the Theages.  
 Other prosopographical signposts provide further clues to the Theages’ central 
concerns. For example, Theages also appears in Plato’s Apology, where the charge of 
“corrupting the youth” recalls another way of viewing the influence of intellectuals on 
young men (reiterating Demodocus’ fears). There Socrates mentions that Theages’ 
brother will not testify that Socrates has done him any harm (33e7). The implication is 
that Socrates’ company has not harmed Theages, and has probably benefited him. But the 
problem of education is not entirely dissolved by this reassuring information, since we 
learn in Plato’s Republic that what saved Theages was not virtue, wisdom, or Socrates’ 
purposive guidance, but the so-called “bridle of Theages”: he happened to be too sick to 
sustain politicking (Resp. 496b6-c2). From these intertexts I conjecture that in 
                                                
9 This interpretive summary has benefited from the three extended readings of the 
dialogue I have been able to consult: Pangle 1987; Bailly 2004, 8-28; and (especially) 
Joyal 2000, 9-58.    
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dramatizing the beginning of Theages’ relationship with Socrates, this dialogue intends to 
provoke thought about the promises and risks of such educational relationships. It is 
therefore not coincidental that the Theages and the Alcibiades both highlight the 
unpredictable influence of the daimonion and “the god” in educational progress.10 For the 
two dialogues form a sort of doublet, each dramatizing the beginning of philosophy, but 
one pointing toward its tragic collapse, the other toward its fortuitous blossoming. Nor is 
it surprising that as many Neoplatonists make Alcibiades the first dialogue on their 
curriculum, others put Theages in that position.11 Before beginning to learn, aspiring 
philosophers need to reflect on the mechanisms and conditions of learning.  
 To return to the details of the Theages, Socrates now insists that he must examine 
the youngster about the wisdom for which he is seeking a teacher. This will not amount 
to a full-blooded definitional inquiry into σοφία, although its thematic importance 
explains the subtitle reported in some of the manuscripts of both Plato and Diogenes 
Laertius: “on wisdom” or περὶ σοφίας (D.L. 3.59). (Other manuscripts give περὶ 
φιλοσοφίας , which fits better with my suggestion that the dialogue was used to provoke 
thought about undertaking philosophy.)12 Socrates begins by getting Theages to agree 
that whoever is wise is so by possessing understanding, i.e. by being ἐπιστήµων, and 
that possessors of understanding must possess understanding about something (περὶ + 
                                                
10 Alcibiades begins with Socrates invoking the daemonic sign to explain why he has 
waited so long to approach Alcibiades, and why he now hopes his philosophical 
intervention will succeed. Pavlu 1909 claims that the primary aim of the Theages is to 
explicate the phrase ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ at Alc. 135d6. Cf. Bailly 2004, 279-84. 
11 Regarding the first Alcibiades, see Olympiodorus In Alc. 10.18-11.6 ed. Westerink; 
Anon. Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy 219.26.18-20 ed. Westerink; Proclus In Alc. 
11.3-17 ed. Segonds. Regarding Theages, see Alb. Intr. 149.5 ed. Nüsser. For both, see 
D.L. 3.62.      
12 The evidence is collected in Joyal 2000, 175 and 195. On the thematic importance of 
σοφία, see the thought-provoking comments of Pangle 1987, 147-50.   
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genitive) or understand how to do something (ἐπίστασθαι + infinitive, 122e5-23d13). 
Socrates asks Theages what he lacks understanding of, such that he needs an instructor. Is 
it the wisdom by which one guides a boat, for example? or a chariot? or a team of horses? 
Theages answers all of these questions in the negative. “So what is the wisdom you 
want?” Socrates asks. “What can we knowledgeably guide with this wisdom?” (ἧς δὲ δὴ 
σὺ ἐπιθυµεῖς ἡ σοφία τίς ἐστιν; ᾗ τίνος ἐπιστάµεθα ἄρχειν; 123d15-e1). Here Joyal 
rightly remarks that Socrates is “reasoning ad hominem”: if he did not already have a 
good idea of the sort of wisdom Theages is after, he would have no reason to assume it 
involved “guiding” anything.13 But one purpose of this part of the dialogue is to make 
Theages aware of the vagueness of his conception of “wisdom” and the hastiness of his 
rush to pay someone who professes to teach it. Socrates guesses that Theages wants to 
enter politics, and so leads him to see that the relevant wisdom must be spelled out by the 
teacher, the student, or both in cooperation. And it makes a great difference how it is 
spelled out, as the next part of the conversation reveals.  
 For under Socrates’ guidance, Theages now stipulates that he wants the wisdom 
by which one guides (i.e. rules14) humans – not the sick, for one rules them by medicine; 
nor those singing in choruses, for one rules them by musical expertise; and so forth. 
Rather, Theages wants the wisdom by which one rules “both all of these and also the 
farmers, the architects, and every kind of artisan and private citizens, both men and 
women” (124b5-8).15 Socrates now suggests five mythical and historical figures who 
match this description, including Aegisthus, the infamous adulterer of Argos, and 
                                                
13 2000, 21-2. 
14 The Greek ἄρχειν may be used of both boats and humans, unlike English “rule.”   
15 Souilhé 1930, 147 n. 1 observes that 123d8-124d closely parallels Plato, Alc. 125b-d.  
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Archelaus of Macedon, the outstandingly vicious tyrant from Plato’s Gorgias.16 Theages 
grudgingly admits that these men share the name “tyrant,” and the activity of “tyranny,” 
so that “it seems from what I have said” that he desires the wisdom going by that name 
(124e10).17 Here Socrates histrionically exclaims, “You rascal! You mean you’ve been 
blaming your father for not sending you to a tyrant-teacher, because you wanted to 
tyrannize us?” (124e11-125a2). By now Theages has seen how slippery dialectic can be, 
and how careful you have to be when purchasing “wisdom.” Not only will he have 
grasped this intellectually, but he’ll be emotionally invested in better formulating his goal 
and finding an appropriate teacher, because Socrates’ repetitive piling up of examples, his 
deliberately obtuse misunderstandings, and his histrionics are all provocatively 
frustrating. This frustration climaxes when Socrates asks whether Theages seeks a teacher 
with the same art as Callicrite, whom Anacreon, undoubtedly in an erotic metaphor, said 
to “understand matters tyrannical” (125d13-e2). “For some time now, Socrates,” Theages 
interjects, “you’ve been making fun of me and playing around with me” (125e4). He 
“comes alive,” as Bailly comments,18 and explains that though he might pray to become a 
tyrant, and even a god, still his desire is merely to rule by consent and not by force, like 
Themistocles, Pericles, and Cimon.19  
                                                
16 Grg. 470d-71d. The other three are less obviously villainous. The reputation of Hippias 
of Athens was not good, but that of Periander of Corinth was mixed (elsewhere often 
numbered among the Seven Sages, but not by Plato; see Bailly 2004, 163). Achilles’ 
father Peleus is the oddest choice here.  
17 Pangle 1987, 157-8 suggests that Socrates intends to “shock” Theages into 
contemplating the real political consequences of believing in an “architectonic science” 
of ruling, which include the authoritarian rule of its practitioners.  
18 2004, 16. 
19 Bailly 2004, 183 is probably right to call this prayer to become a god a humorous 
reductio of the aspiration to tyrannical rule (which is not to deny that it possesses a kernel 
of genuine wishfulness). Cf. Zuckert 2009, 488.   
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 Now Theages is beginning to have a clearer and more urgent sense of what he 
does and does not want in terms of wisdom, but here the focus shifts from defining 
wisdom to exploring the possibility of learning it. (To put it another way, the topic 
remains the same—learning wisdom—but Socrates shifts the emphasis from the latter to 
the former term.20) For Socrates proposes that if Theages wants to learn this sort of 
politics, he should simply associate with those who are versed in it; but Theages produces 
a Socratic counterargument to this suggestion: “I’ve heard people saying that you make 
the argument that the sons of politicians are no better than the sons of cobblers” (126d1-
4).21 Theages then asks Socrates to undertake his education, thus moving the dialogue 
toward a comparison between Socrates and sophists or politicians as associates for young 
men. The conversation now concludes with several pages discussing whether and how 
young men make progress through Socrates’ company. In other words, it concludes with 
a consideration of whether and how Socrates helps his associates achieve wisdom. This is 
where the interpretive controversy really begins. 
 First, Socrates encourages Theages to learn from his father, or from the sophists 
“who profess an ability to educate young men,” since 
I don’t understand any of these blessed and fine points of learning, although I’d 
like to. But I’m always saying that I happen to understand nothing, except for one 
small bit of learning, matters of eros. I think I’m terrific at this learning compared 
to anyone either past or present. (128b1-6) 
 
Here we encounter the first important point of scholarly contestation. When Socrates says 
he “understands” eros (ἐπίστασθαι) and refers to this understanding as an object of 
                                                
20 Joyal 2000, 40 persuasively argues that what Socrates will actually offer is not the 
possibility—however uncertain—of becoming σοφός, which belongs only to the gods, 
but of becoming ὡς βέλτιστος (127d5) and a πολίτης ἀγαθός (127d7).   
21 Souilhé 1930, 153 provides the following references: Meno 93e11-94a7, Prt. 319d7-
20b3, Alc. 118c7-19a7.  
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“learning” (µάθηµα), what sort of cognitive process or informational content does he 
have in mind? Will other elements of the conclusion contradict this implication that 
Socratic eros has a cognitive component? Even if nothing contradicts it, will the dialogue 
leave it unintelligibly vague?22 These questions are important to the overall interpretation 
of the Theages, since Socrates obviously puts forth his erotic “understanding” and 
“learning” as key elements of his educational impact.  
 Whatever Socrates’ intention, Theages objects again that Socrates is just “playing 
around with us” (128c1). He explains that he has seen many of his age-mates make 
extraordinary progress through Socrates’ company, by which he means to imply that 
Socrates has plenty of helpful “understanding” and “learning.” This prompts Socrates to 
add his second disclaimer about the idiosyncrasy of learning in his company: 
 “Do you know what sort of thing this is, son of Demodocus?”  
 “By Zeus I do: it’s that, if you’re willing, I too will be able to become the 
sort of person they are.”  
 “No, my good man, its nature has escaped you, but I’ll tell you. There’s a 
daemonic thing [δαιµόνιον] that’s been following me by divine dispensation 
since I was a child. This is a voice that always issues a prohibition against 
something I’m about to do, but never urges me to do something. And if one of my 
friends is with me and the voice occurs, the same thing, it gives a warning and 
doesn’t permit action.” (128c6-d7) 
 
Theages’ faith in Socrates’ ability simply to hand over wisdom belongs to an erotic topos 
in the Platonic corpus.23 It therefore links the foregoing assertion of erotic expertise with 
the forthcoming discussion of the daimonion. While this discussion begins with a close 
echo of Plato’s Apology (31d2-4), it appends the assertion that Socrates’ daimonion also 
speaks on his friends’ behalf (cf. Xen. Mem. 1.1.4-5). This is a vital addition, since it 
                                                
22 Cf. Joyal 2000, 40-6; Bailly 2004, 23-4. 
23 See especially Smp. 217a1-18b2, where Alcibiades conceives the plan to trade sexual 
gratification for Socrates’ wisdom; and Alc. 135c10-d6, where Alcibiades declares he can 
escape his slavish condition if Socrates so wishes. 
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enables Socrates to claim that divine intervention, like erotic understanding, is 
characteristic of education in his company. First he recounts three anecdotes about 
daemonic premonitions concerning his friends. These anecdotes do not pertain to 
education directly, but prepare Theages for Socrates’ claim that “the power of this 
daemonic thing also has almighty influence over my associations with those who pass 
time with me” (ἡ δύναµις αὕτη τοῦ δαιµονίου τούτου καὶ εἰς τὰς συνουσίας τῶν µετ᾿ 
ἐµοῦ συνδιατριβόντων τὸ ἅπαν δύναται, 129e1-3). This brings us to the second great 
interpretive controversy regarding the conclusion of the Theages.     
 At issue in this controversy is whether faith in this “almighty influence” of the 
daimonion substantially replaces cooperative critical reflection as a mode of 
philosophical progress. Has what we usually call “dialectic,” i.e. elenctic testing of 
received beliefs, become unimportant to Socratic education in the Theages? Socrates’ 
concluding words, which focus on daemonic intervention in education, may appear to 
supply an answer in the affirmative. He continues from the last quotation,   
[This daimonion] is opposed to many, and these can’t benefit from spending time 
with me, so I can’t spend time with them. It doesn’t prevent me from being with 
many others, but they aren’t benefited. But whomever the power of the daimonion 
has assisted in their association [with me], these are the ones you’ve noticed, for 
they make progress immediately.24 Some of those who make progress receive a 
firm and lasting benefit, but many make amazing progress so long as they’re with 
                                                
24 The Greek reads οἷς δ᾿ ἂν συλλάβηται τῆς συνουσίας ἡ τοῦ δαιµονίου δύναµις, 
οὗτοι εἰσιν ὧν καὶ σὺ ᾔσθησαι· ταχὺ γὰρ παραχῆµα ἐπιδιδόασιν. I maintain the 
clause ordering of the Greek, although it is slightly awkward in English. As Cobb 1992, 
276 argues, this clause ordering makes clear that what is immediately explained by “for 
these make progress immediately” is Theages’ having noticed them. However, pace 
Cobb, the sentence also implies that what causes this progress is the power of the 
daimonion. For Cobb’s translation is indefensible: “Yet there are some among those 
whom the power of the daimonic sign assists in our association who are the ones you 
have noticed, for they improve immediately” (ibid. 276-7). The words “some among 
those” requires us to invent an implied partitive genitive before οὗτοί, which nothing in 
the Greek text justifies.  
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me, but are no different from anyone else once they’re parted from me. This once 
happened to Aristides, son of Lysimachus and grandson of Aristides.  (129e3-
30a5) 
 
Much of this passage is compatible with the midwifery passage of Plato’s Theaetetus, 
with which the Theages is clearly in some kind of intertextual dialogue. It is worth 
quoting that passage now in its entirety, since I will return to parts of it repeatedly in the 
course of this article: 
I generate no wisdom, and the common accusation against me is true: I interrogate 
others, but myself assert nothing about anything, because I have no wisdom. The 
reason is this: the god forces me to be a midwife, but forbids me to procreate. So 
I’m not wise at all, nor do I have any such discovery which is the offspring of my 
soul. But though some who associate with me seem very ignorant at first, all 
whom the god permits make wonderful progress as our acquaintance continues, as 
both they and others believe. It’s clear that they’ve never learned anything from 
me, but have found in themselves many fair things and have given birth to them. 
But the god and I are responsible for the midwifery. Many have failed to 
recognize this and believed themselves responsible for their progress, and 
accordingly disdained me, and left me earlier than they should have either on their 
own or through the persuasion of others. After leaving they miscarried their other 
offspring through bad company and killed whatever I had midwifed because they 
nourished it poorly. They valued falsehoods and phantasms more than the truth, 
and ultimately appeared ignorant both to themselves and others. Among these 
were Aristides son of Lysimachus and many others. When these people come 
back and ask to renew our association, making extraordinary promises, my 
customary daimonion forbids me to associate with some of them, but permits 
association with others, and these once again make progress. (150c4-51a5) 
 
Both passages begin from the insistence that Socrates is not himself wise,25 and so 
achieves his educational influence through some sort of divine assistance. In the Theages 
this is the daimonion; in the Theaetetus, it is “the god” (ὁ θεός) in coordination with the 
daimonion. The Theages’ daimonion may immediately refuse Socrates’ association with 
someone, may permit association but fail to help, or may help with either temporary or 
lasting “benefit” and “progress” (ὠφελία, ἐπιδιδόναι). In the Theaetetus, the god may 
                                                
25 With the exception, in the Theages, of erotic understanding.  
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either permit progress or (implicitly) forbid it;26 progress may be temporary for followers 
who leave too soon (or, implicitly, lasting for those who remain); and the daimonion may 
either permit or forbid a lapsed follower to return to Socrates’ company. There are some 
divergences in detail up to this point, the most important of which is that the Theages 
attributes wholly to the daimonion what the Theatetetus distributes between the 
daimonion and the god. But if we temporarily set aside this distinction, clearly the two 
dialogues’ depiction of divine involvement in education is broadly similar. This will turn 
out to be very important for the interpretation of the conclusion of the Theages.  
 However, the Theages adds an element which has no obvious parallel in the 
Theaetetus. This is Aristides’ own account of how his “progress” disappeared after he 
departed from Socrates: 
Before I sailed away I could talk with anyone and appear worse than no one in 
words, so I pursued the company of the wittiest people. But now, quite the 
contrary, I run when I see anyone educated. That’s how ashamed I am of my 
mediocrity. (130c2-6) 
 
Socrates asks where this power came from, and how it left him, and Aristides goes on, 
It’s unbelievable, by the gods! But it’s true. I never learned anything from you, as 
you yourself know. But I made progress whenever I was with you, even if I was 
only in the same household, but not in the same room; more when I was in the 
same room; and much more, I thought, when I was in the same room and was 
looking at you, rather than when I looked elsewhere; and I made by far the most 
progress when I sat beside you holding and touching you. But now, this whole 
condition has flowed away. (130d4-e4) 
 
This passage seems to eliminate the dependence of educational progress on cooperative 
critical inquiry, since Aristides credits looking, holding, and touching (βλέπειν, ἔχεσθαι, 
                                                
26 Bailly 2004, 272 argues that it is unclear whether the god “permits” (παρεικῇ) would-
be learners to make progress or simply to associate with Socrates. But the distinction is 
not significant, since even if we take the god simply to permit association, this amounts 
to permitting progress.  
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ἅπτεσθαι) rather than speaking with the rapidity of his learning. The implication may be 
that as his “condition has flowed away” since his departure (ἡ ἕξις ἐξερρύηκεν), so 
previously the power of the daimonion simply “flowed into” him. The Theages would 
then be attributing to Socrates precisely the sort of conductive influence he denies in 
Plato’s Symposium, where he clearly implies that wisdom is not the sort of thing “to flow 
from the fuller of us into the emptier if we touch each another” (175d4-7).27       
 Anyone inclined to read Aristides’ words as a straightforward account of the sort 
of education proposed by the Theages will find confirmation in the dialogue’s 
dénouement. Socrates concludes,  
So that’s what association with me is like. If the god so pleases, you’ll make a lot 
of progress quickly. If not, you won’t. So consider whether it isn’t safer for you to 
be educated by someone who’s in control of the benefit he can offer, rather than 
to take your chances with me. 
 
Theages responds,  
What I think we should do, Socrates, is test this daimonion by being together, and 
if it permits, so much the better. If not, then right away we’ll deliberate about 
what we should do, whether we’ll be with someone else, or attempt to persuade 
this divine thing that happens to you with prayers and sacrifices and whatever else 
the prophets suggest.  (130e5-31a7) 
 
In the first part of this quotation Socrates seems to endorse Aristides’ description of how 
benefit and progress come about in his company. In other words, he seems to confirm 
that he benefits students through divine intervention without the mediation of critical 
inquiry. Theages goes a step further, apparently suggesting that this divinity in Socrates 
can actually be influenced by prayers or sacrifices, just like any traditional hero or god of 
cult. This could mean that Socrates’ followers make progress by slaughtering sheep, for 
example, rather than applying themselves to dialectical investigations. It is also 
                                                
27 This charge is made most concisely and vehemently by Tarrant 1958. 
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noteworthy that the agency involved here is renamed “the god,” as in the Theaetetus, as 
well as “the divine thing” (τὸ θεῖον). It is therefore a vaguely amalgamated divine 
agency that this passage highlights.28  
 In the second part of Socrates’ response above, he provides a conclusion for the 
precautionary description he has been offering of education in his company. This 
description, to recapitulate, has comprised his confession of ignorance, profession of 
erotic understanding, and a series of anecdotes about the role played by his daimonion. 
He chooses to encapsulate this discussion’s lesson in a choice he presents Theages: either 
he may study with those who are “in control of the benefit” they offer (ἐγκρατεῖς . . . τῆς 
ὠφελίας), or he may submit himself to “chance” in Socrates’ company (ὅτι ἂν τύχῃς 
τοῦτο πρᾶξαι).29 This recalls the conjecture about this dialogue’s purpose with which I 
began, namely that it aims to provoke thought about the techniques and vicissitudes of 
the pursuit of excellence and wisdom through philosophical education. Socrates groups 
these techniques and vicissitudes under the heading of “chance” (τύχη), thus 
symbolizing the moral communicated also by the biographies of Alcibiades and Theages 
throughout the Platonic corpus: Socrates neither knows nor determines whether his 
educational efforts will meet with success. This too could be taken to undercut the 
rationality of Socratic philosophizing, since it could imply that it is the aleatory whim of 
the daimonion rather than the purposeful enterprise of cooperative reasoning which 
determines progress. The dialogue’s ending gives us no help in deciding its meaning. In 
                                                
28 This recalls the depersonalized philosophical god ascribed to Socrates by Burnyeat 
1997.  
29 In this case πρᾶξαι has the same sense as in εὖ πράττειν, “doing well.”  
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the face of Theages’ unrelenting enthusiasm, Socrates simply acquiesces: “Well, if you 
think this is what we should do, then let’s do it” (131a10). 
2. Erotic Understanding 
 This article will culminate in a re-interpretation of what it means to say that the 
intervention of this amalgamated divine agency and narrowing of Socrates’ knowledge to 
eros amounts to the predominance of chance in his associates’ educational progress. First 
I must investigate the controversies regarding eros and daemonic agency in more depth, 
beginning with the former.  
 As we have just seen, the principal objection to erotic education in the Theages is 
that it is irrational or has no cognitive dimension. Although Socrates claims that erotics is 
his special field of “understanding” (ἐπίστασθαι) and an object of “learning” (µάθηµα), 
it may appear that he exercises neither understanding nor learning in his erotic activity. 
Furthermore, it may seem that his students’ progress is similarly void of reasoning. In this 
section I will argue that the Theages’ prominent allusions to Plato’s Symposium should 
predispose us to believe just the opposite: in that dialogue, Diotima provides a clear 
model for how erotic expertise works, which unambiguously involves cooperative 
rational inquiry. I will then suggest that parts of the story of Aristides in Plato’s 
Theaetetus correspond closely to this model in the Symposium. This casts further light on 
why Aristides appears at this stage in the Theages, and corroborates our expectation that 
eros in this dialogue remains intimately connected to rationality. Finally, I will argue that 
nothing in the Aristides anecdote in the Theages requires us to reject the interpretation 
suggested by the allusions to the Symposium and the Theaetetus. To the contrary, 
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Aristides’ should be read as a cautionary tale, which confirms the importance of making 
reflection on ethics central to educational eros.   
 Let me begin by reconfirming that the Theages does indeed allude to Plato’s 
Symposium. The most important part of this allusion is not in Aristides’ report of some 
capacity “flowing” into him, but in Socrates’ claim of erotic knowledge. This is a close 
echo of Socrates’ assertion in the Symposium:  
I’m always saying that I happen to understand nothing, except one small bit of 
learning, matters of eros. (Thg. 128b3-4) 
 
I say that I understand nothing other than matters of eros. (Smp. 177d7-8) 
 
Similar statements appear in the Lysis and the Phaedrus,30 the latter of which may also be 
helpful for understanding the Theages.31 However, the Symposium is likely to be the 
primary point of reference, since it is a much more exact verbal reminiscence. Readers 
who are familiar with the Platonic canon will therefore be primed to notice the second 
allusion in Aristides’ report. Here are the key parallel passages:32   
I made by far the most progress when I sat beside you holding and touching you. 
But now, this whole condition has flowed away. (Thg. 130e2-4) 
 
 “Come sit down by me, Socrates,” [Agathon] said, “so I can touch you and 
share the wisdom that came to you on the porch. …” 
                                                
30 Ly. 204b8-c2: “I’m pretty mediocre and useless at everything else, but it has somehow 
been given to me by god to recognize quickly a lover and a beloved.” Cf. Phdr. 257a7-8: 
(Socrates praying to Eros) “be propitious and gracious and neither take away the erotic 
craft you have given me nor mutilate it out of anger.” There is also an intriguing parallel 
in Aeschines’ Alc. (fr. VI A 53 in Giannantoni 1990), which Joyal 2000, 42-7 discusses. 
However, I argue elsewhere that we possess too little of Aeschines’ dialogue to discern 
what he thinks about eros and education (Lampe 2010, 195-6). 
31 Although I only briefly discuss the Phaedrus below, grounds for most of the arguments 
I make on the basis of the Symposium could also be found in the Phaedrus.  
32 Tarrant 1958 and Joyal 2000, 92-3 and 289 see an allusion here to the Symposium. 
Cobb 1992, 281-3 disagrees. Bailly, 2004, 257-8 does not take a clear position on 
whether our author is responding to this passage in the Symposium. 
 
18 
 Socrates sat down and said, “It would be great, Agathon, if wisdom were 
the sort of thing to flow from the fuller of us into the emptier if we touched one 
another, like water in cups that flows across a wool thread from the fuller to the 
emptier. (Smp. 175c7-d7) 
 
These passages obviously share several elements. First, they both involve the 
transmission of “wisdom” (σοφία) in particular. This is explicit in the Symposium 
passage, and of course is the central concern of the Theages generally. Second, they both 
involve the transmission of wisdom by “touching” (ἅπτεσθαι). Third, they represent this 
transmission in terms of something “flowing” into or out of the learner (ῥεῖν or ἐκρεῖν). 
This is enough to justify adopting the hypothesis that our author intends an allusion to 
Plato’s Symposium. Furthermore, it should make us suspect that Aristides’ testimony is 
supposed to call into question how wisdom may be communicated in erotic relationships. 
However, we should suspend judgment for the moment about whether the Theages 
espouses the form of tactile transmission these two passages represent. It will better to 
answer that question after we have considered the significance of the first allusion to the 
Symposium and explored Aristides’ character both in the Theaetetus and in the Theages.  
 In the Symposium I will focus on the speech of Socrates, which is where our 
author would naturally look for an explanation of Socrates’ erotic expertise. There we 
find a model of eros as something that not only permits rational satisfaction, but indeed 
benefits from guidance that involves “understanding” and “learning.” Since this is 
familiar territory, I will be brief.33 In this dialogue Socrates (and/or Diotima, whose 
words he supposedly communicates) describes eros as a universal human drive, which he 
formulates in several overlapping ways: it is the desire to possess the good forever 
                                                
33 My understanding of this part of the Symposium has been influenced by Nussbaum 
1986, 165-99; Morgan 1990, 80-99; Halperin 2005; Sheffield 2006; and Hyland 2008, 
27-63. 
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(206a11-12), or to be happy (205a1-3), or to be with and give birth in beauty (206e2-5 + 
211e4-12a2), or to be immortal and beloved by god (212a5-7). Whether Socrates 
succeeds in reducing all of these to a single intelligible account of eros is irrelevant for 
my purposes; the important thing is that he presents eros as an educable unified drive. 
This unified drive finds substantial satisfaction through cooperative rational inquiry (at 
least for those who are “pregnant [ἐγκύµονες] in soul” as well as “in body”: 208e1-9a1), 
as a key passage reveals:  
[The lover] embraces beautiful bodies more readily than ugly ones, since he is 
pregnant, and if he encounters a soul that is beautiful and noble and well formed, 
he certainly embraces both [body and soul] together. With this person he right 
away easily discovers many discourses about virtue and what a good man is like 
and how he behaves, and he tries to educate this person. For by touching this 
beautiful person and being with him, I think, he begets and gives birth to what he 
has long been pregnant with. He remembers the other in presence and absence, 
and brings up what he has borne in cooperation with him, so that these two share 
something much greater than children and have a firmer friendship. (Smp. 209b4-
c6) 
 
It is worth noting that this passage once again employs the language of “touching” 
(ἁπτόµενος) in order to describe an erotic relationship that is simultaneously 
educational.34 It will also be important that the result of “touching this beautiful person 
and being with him” is that the lover “begets and gives birth to what he has long been 
pregnant with” (ἃ πάλαι ἐκύει τίκτει καὶ γεννᾷ). What he “has long been pregnant with” 
is “many discourses about virtue and what a good man is like and how he behaves.” The 
lover and beloved as a pair “bring up what [the lover] has borne” as their “children.” In 
other words, the lover responds to the touch and company of his beloved by engaging in 
ethical investigations, and the pair then cooperate in developing the results of those 
investigations. In fact, in the Socratic context we know that the ostensible “beloved” 
                                                
34 As Bailly 2004, 257 also notes. 
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typically becomes a lover in his own right, so that both members of the loving pair will 
be “giving birth to” and “bringing up” ethical discourses.35 This passage thus presents 
cooperative critical inquiry as a natural outlet for the erotic drive. 
 Of course, Socrates admits that many people will not immediately recognize 
either the unified goal of eros or the possibility of satisfying it through philosophy. They 
will think of sex, glory, and power as more plausible forms of satisfaction. This is why 
education by an “expert” can benefit them. As Diotima’s famous ascent passage reveals, 
the erotic relationship should not remain on a single plane of inquiry and satisfaction. 
Rather, the combination of erotic drive and critical reflection should lead the lover toward 
ever purer and more satisfying intuitions of beauty – from bodies to souls, discourses, 
laws, systems of knowledge, and eventually to Beauty Itself (210a4-11b5). In fact, it 
turns out that bodily seeing and touching is merely a preparation for “seeing” and 
“touching” Beauty Itself with the soul. Visual and tactile language recurs with great 
insistence in the climax of the ascent passage:   
“What are we to believe, if someone were able to see (ἰδεῖν) Beauty pure, 
cleansed, unmixed, unfilled with human flesh and coloring and all that mortal 
nonsense, but rather could glimpse (κατιδεῖν) divine Beauty itself all alone? Do 
you think a man would have a bad life if he were looking (βλέποντος) at that and 
watching it with the appropriate part of himself (ῷ δεῖ θεωµένου) and being with 
it (συνόντος)? Don’t you think,” she said, “that there alone, seeing Beauty with 
that by which it is visible (ὁρῶντι ῷ ὁρατὸν), he’d be able to give birth to true 
virtue, not images of virtue, since he’d be touching (ἐφαπτοµένῳ) truth, not 
touching (ἐφαπτοµένῳ) an image?” (Smp. 211d8-12a5)    
                                                
35 See Smp. 222a8-b4 (Alcibiades speaking about Socrates): “I’m not the only one he’s 
done this to. He’s done the same to Charmides son of Glaucon and Euthydemus son of 
Diocles and lots of others. He deceives them as if he were the lover, but ends up as the 
boyfriend himself instead of the lover.” Compare Alc. 135d8-e3 (Alcibiades speaking 
with Socrates): “It seems we’re going to change positions, Socrates: I’ll take yours, and 
you mine. For I’ll certainly follow you around from this day onward, and you’ll be 
followed by me.” “Then, my noble friend, my love will be like a swan, since it’ll have 
engendered an eros in you and in turn be nurtured under its wing.”  
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Psychic touching does not necessarily render bodily touching extraneous, any more than 
loving Beauty Itself makes loving human beings extraneous.36 But it is clear that the 
lover is supposed to use bodily contact and the love of individuals as a stimulus for 
achieving this transcendental intuition and communion. This can most readily happen if 
his erotic activity is guided by someone who has already undergone what Diotima calls 
“the rites and revelations” at which eros aims. This will be an expert who has grasped the 
educable structure of the erotic drive and knows how to guide it in its development. For 
Socrates, this was Diotima; for others, it is Socrates.  
 The question now is whether the model of erotic education I have just outlined, in 
which the understanding of an expert guides the rational inquiry of the lovers toward its 
true goal, is compatible with the experience related by Aristides in the Theages. I have 
already mentioned the origin of the story of Aristides’ failure in the midwifery passage of 
the Theaetetus. At this point I should emphasize that this midwifery passage, like 
Socrates’ speech in the Symposium, involves young men who are “pregnant in soul” 
bringing to birth philosophical discourses and then developing them through critical 
reasoning. In fact the passage begins when Theaetetus confesses that he is both baffled 
and troubled by the investigation at hand, and Socrates responds, “That’s because you’re 
having pregnancy pains, Theaetetus: you’re not empty, but pregnant” (148e6-7). All the 
components of the “mental pregnancy” trope in Symposium 208e1-9c7—being pregnant 
(κύω and ἐγκύµων εἶναι), begetting (γεννῶ), and giving birth (τίκτω)—then recur 
throughout the interlude, for which they provide an occasion: Socrates’ critical 
                                                
36 Though this has been hotly contested in modern scholarship since Vlastos 1981, 3-42, 
it is clear that some ancient exponents of Plato attributed an ongoing role to both bodily 
proximity and individualized eros. See section 5 below.  
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examination of his friends’ beliefs can only be figured as “midwifery” insofar as they are 
“pregnant.” In fact, Socrates says that when young men are not pregnant, they “have no 
need of me,” so he sends them to Prodicus or some other sophist (Tht. 151b1-6). Since 
Aristides was not sent away, it follows that he was pregnant, and that his association with 
Socrates involved his “discursive reason” (διάνοια) “bringing forth” (ἀποτίκτει) 
offspring under Socrates’ guidance (Tht. 150c2). This was clearly a cooperative rational 
process. Socrates must then have “put to the test” whether each offspring was “a fantasm 
and falsehood” or “genuine and true” (150c1-3). This was clearly a form of expert 
guidance. Thus the details of the Theaetetus passage on which our author is drawing 
suggest that Aristides’ experience corresponded in key particulars to the model of eros 
conveyed in the Symposium.37   
 Next we must turn to the Theages itself and re-investigate Aristides’ report of his 
education there. Let us begin by focusing on Aristides’ description of how he learned, 
which is prompted by a question from Socrates: “When you had [this capacity], did you 
have it by learning something from me (µαθόντι παρ᾿ ἐµοῦ), or in some other fashion” 
(130d1-2)? Aristides answers, “I never learned anything from you (ἔµαθον µὲν παρά 
σου οὐδὲν πώποτε), as you yourself know” (130d4-5). This is a clear allusion to the 
parallel passage in the Theaetetus, where Socrates says those who made progress in his 
company “never learned anything from me (παρ᾿ ἐµοῦ οὐδὲν πώποτε µάθοντες), but 
                                                
37 This is not to claim they correspond in every particular. For some important 
differences, see Burnyeat 1977, 8-9. For a detailed study of midwifery in the Theaetetus, 
see Sedley 2004. But they are close enough for an author intent on constructing a Socratic 
education from Platonic materials to assimilate them.   
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have found in themselves many fair things and have given birth to them” (150d6-8).38 
This intertext suggests that in the Theages as well we should assume Aristides was 
“giving birth to many fair things” during his time with Socrates. Socrates more or less 
confirms this by saying, “When he was passing time with me he had made a great deal of 
progress in a short time (πάµπολυ ἐπεδεδώκει ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ)” (Thg. 130a5-6). It is 
unlikely Socrates would describe Aristides as “making progress” unless he were refining 
his beliefs through critical reasoning. The word for “progress” (ἐπιδίδωµι) here is the 
same one used in the Theaetetus (150d5, 151a5); it appears an astounding seven times in 
the conclusion to the Theages (129e9 [twice], 130a3, 130a6, 130d5, 130e2, 130e6). 
Admittedly, Aristides says nothing further about the cognitive content of his education. 
However, he does mention that Socrates was speaking (λέγοντός σου, 130d8) during 
their time together. The parallel texts we have seen give us every reason to surmise that 
this speech involved critical reasoning and was guided by Socrates’ expert understanding 
of the educable structure of eros.  
 This brings us to the real crux, which is Aristides’ excessive emphasis on erotic 
contact as an apparent conduit for irrational progress. If Socrates intended Aristides’ 
words as a perspicacious and trustworthy description of the education he offered, we 
would have to come to one of two conclusions: either our author misunderstood and 
accidentally distorted the forms of education represented in the Symposium and 
Theaetetus, or else he understood them and chose to emphatically signpost his 
disagreement. The latter is implausible, so it is not surprising that Joyal favors the former:  
                                                
38 Bailly 2004, 252-3 calls attention instead to Meno 72c6-d2. While our author may also 
intend that reference, it is far less obviously to the point, and contains nothing like the 
almost exact verbal echo of the Theaetetus.  
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What is remarkable about the use of these sources is, first, our author’s apparent 
disregard of the fact that in Smp. the idea of education by contact is ridiculed … 
and, second, the author’s neglect of, and general lack of interest in, the probable 
dialectical context of the work or works in which he found further material for the 
story of Aristides (this neglect is of course in addition to his disregard of the 
dialectical activity which is integral to the µαιευτική passage in Tht.).39 
 
Joyal is right that this would be “remarkable.” Moreover, it would undercut the 
explanation these contexts provide for Socrates’ claim of erotic expertise, and once again 
render that claim unintelligible.  
 We should therefore consider the possibility that Aristides is not a reliable witness 
to the cause or nature of his own progress and corruption. After all, in the Theaetetus 
Socrates includes Aristides among those who “believed themselves responsible for their 
progress, and accordingly disdained me, and left me earlier than they should have.” In the 
Theages it appears that Thucydides is about to fall into this group: 
So when he saw me Aristides said, “I hear that Thucydides is acting arrogant and 
irritable toward you, as if he were really something.” “That’s the truth,” I said. 
“Doesn’t he know what a slave he was before he met you,” he asked. “By the 
gods, he certainly doesn’t seem to,” I said. (Thg. 130b3-8) 
 
Here Thucydides shares both of the characteristics of the failed students in the 
Theaetetus: first, they are arrogant (they “disdained” [καταφρονήσαντες] Socrates; 
Thucydides is “acting arrogant … as if he were really something” [σεµνύνεσθαι ἄττα … 
ὡς τὶ ὄντα]); second, they refuse to recognize Socrates’ role in their progress (they 
“believed themselves responsible” [ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιασάµενοι]; Thucydides “doesn’t know 
… what a slave he was before he met you” [οὐκ οἶδεν … πρὶν σοὶ συγγενέσθαι οἷον ἦν 
τὸ ἀνδράποδον]). Aristides shows much greater humility in the Theages, but that is 
because he has now reached the terminal condition Socrates ascribes to these failed 
                                                
39 2000, 92.  
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students in the Theaetetus: “ultimately they appeared ignorant both to themselves and to 
others.” The reason Aristides so easily and eagerly diagnoses Thucydides’ mistake is 
because he has made it himself and now regrets it. That is why he goes immediately from 
criticizing Thucydides to lamenting the results of his own departure from Socrates: 
“‘Well, I too am in a laughable state, Socrates,’ he said” (Thg. 130b8-c1).40  
 Aristides now perceives that Socrates’ help was essential for his progress, but that 
does not mean he grasps what Socratic education is really about. In fact his troublingly 
un-Socratic description of what he had once achieved confirms that he remains an honor-
driven young man like Thucydides, with an extremely superficial understanding of 
philosophy’s goals. The heart of this description is his statement that “before I sailed 
away I could talk with anyone and appear worse than no one in words, so I pursued the 
company of the wittiest people.” Here Bailly comments,  
It strikes a bizarre note to hear Socrates in an unsolicited explanation of what 
progress with him is like quoting Aristides to the effect that he made progress at 
what looks like eristics or mere wit-bandying without qualifying the quotation.41    
 
Bailly is right that the Socrates we know from other dialogues would never call 
“appearing worse than no one in words” (µηδενὸς χείρων φαίνεσθαι ἐν λόγοις) an index 
of real progress. This sounds rather like the sort of superficial and competitive mastery of 
arguments criticized in the Phaedo (90b4-91a6). The title character of the Clitophon 
                                                
40 At Theages 130a6-7 we are told that Aristides left Socrates for a military expedition. 
Joyal 2000, 287 says that “the circumstances of Aristides’ departure from Socrates are 
different in the Thg. [than in the Tht.],” implying that leaving on an expedition is 
incompatible with leaving through the contemptuous belief that he no longer needs 
Socrates. In fact the two may well be compatible (so too Bailly 2004, 275). For example, 
Aristides may have decided that he was ready to begin his political career, and joined the 
expedition in the belief the hope of winning the prestige which would improve his 
prospects. 
41 2004, 250; italics in original. Joyal 2000, 287 notes that “some irony may be intended 
in Aristides’ misconceived boast,” but does not explain further. 
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(408d1-10a6) and Alcibiades in Xenophon’s Memorabilia (1.2.40-6) display precisely 
this sort of competence in Socratic argumentation without grounding in ethical 
transformation. This kind of verbal wrangling belongs to the same cultural complex as 
the arrogance of Socrates’ failed students and Thucydides’ irascibility. This complex can 
be loosely characterized as ancient Greek “honor culture.”42 Whatever transformation 
Aristides had once begun to undergo, he certainly had not arrived at an accurate 
appreciation of the real goals of Socratic education. To the contrary, what he valued was 
primarily that it helped him to compete for attention and prestige. Theages’ reference to 
“the company of the wittiest people” (τὰς συνουσίας τῶν χαριεστάτων ἀνθρώπων, 
Thg. 130c4) should be read against the backdrop of his assumptions about a community 
of peers competing for honor. The priorities of this community are incompatible with 
lasting philosophical progress. The “witty company” Theages sought thus recalls the “bad 
company” (πονηρὰν συνουσίαν) through which Socrates claims his educational 
“babies” have often been “miscarried” (ἐξήµβλωσαν) and “killed” (ἀπώλεσαν, Tht. 
150e4-6).  
 This gives us a strong reason to doubt that we should take Aristides’ report of his 
own experience as a straightforward account of the nature and mechanisms of Socratic 
education. I suggest instead that we are supposed to find his report “remarkable” (Joyal) 
and “bizarre” (Bailly). His is a cautionary tale, and one that is particularly germane for an 
ambitious young Athenian like Theages. Moreover, insofar as many students at the fourth 
and third century Academy are also aspirants to political office, Aristides’ 
misunderstanding contains important lessons for them as well. Aristides fixated on his 
                                                
42 See Cohen 1995, 61-86; Allen 1999, 50-72. On the importance of this honor culture to 
Plato’s ethics, see especially Hobbs 2000.    
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progress in reasoning and argumentation, which are very useful skills in the agonistic 
arena of Athenian politics. However, he never appreciated the incipient transformation of 
character and intellect which had underlain that argumentative capacity and toward which 
that capacity was supposed to be oriented. It is therefore not surprising if he focused on 
the superficial aspects of Socratic eros as well, and overlooked its essential goal and 
fundamental driver. He remembers the erotic yearning to look and touch, which he 
rightly associated with learning; but he undervalued the cooperative critical refinement of 
his vision of beauty and goodness, which was the real content of that learning. To put it 
another way, he never realized that bodily contact between lovers does not simply open a 
conduit for wisdom; rather, it stimulates the lovers to use their words and souls for 
viewing and touching higher forms of beauty.  
 This brings us back to the metaphor of “flowing” and a final intertext. While it is 
true that this metaphor recalls Socrates’ banter with Agathon in the Symposium, it should 
also be noted that nouns and verbs from this root appear abundantly in the palinode of 
Plato’s Phaedrus.43 What is flowing between lover and beloved there is not progress tout 
court, but an invigorating reminder of our higher nature and of the transcendent beings 
dimly recollected by our immortal souls – the ethical and epistemic goals of 
philosophical inquiry. By the logic of this passage we would say that Aristides felt the 
rush of this transcendental conduit, but once again failed to make the right connections 
                                                
43 There Socrates speaks of the “flow of beauty” (τὸ τοῦ κάλλους ῥεῦµα, 255c6), “off-
flow of beauty” (τοῦ κάλλους τὴν ἀπορροὴν, 251b1-2), and “nourishment flowing 
into” the soul (ἐπιρρυείσης τῆς τροφῆς, 251b5). He even goes so far as to fancifully 
etymologize “desire” (ἵµερος) as a compound of “coming” (ἐπίοντα), “particles” of 
beauty (µέρη), and “flowing” (ῥέοντα, 251c6-7). 
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between this sensation, seeing and touching Socrates, improving his techniques of 
reasoning and arguing, and learning about his true nature and proper aspirations.  
 In this section I have attempted to dispel the first accusation leveled against the 
conclusion of the Theages, which is that its ascription of erotic “understanding” to 
Socrates is either a misnomer (“understanding” is in no way involved) or simply a 
mystery (“understanding” is not explained). I have argued that our author’s emphatic 
allusions to Plato’s Symposium and Theaetetus give us everything we need to understand 
in what fashion Socratic education in the Theages is both erotic and rational. 
Furthermore, I have suggested that Aristides’ description of his own experience should be 
read as a cautionary tale, not a straightforward report of how Socratic eros is supposed to 
enable progress. There is more to say about both the parallel with the Symposium and the 
role of Theages in all of this. But that will take us into the discussion of the amalgamated 
daimonion-god, which is the topic for the next section.   
3. Daemonic Influence 
  Notwithstanding what I have just said about the rationality of erotic education in 
the Theages, it might be objected that the greatest problem remains untouched: Aristides’ 
progress is supposed to exemplify the “almighty power” of Socrates’ daimonion, and that 
power has nothing to do with cooperative reasoning. Hence even if the educational power 
of eros cannot be reduced to tactile transmission, it may be that the power of the 
daimonion can. This suspicion might be amplified by modern secular assumptions about 
the autonomy of human reasoning, which could lead us to believe that if daemonic power 
is driving a student’s progress, to that extent reason is being supplanted. In this section I 
will first argue that those modern assumptions are anachronistic. Neither in the ambient 
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culture of fourth century Greece nor in Plato’s dialogues in particular does daemonic 
intervention necessarily compromise the integrity of human reasoning. I will then argue 
that erotic influence and daemonic influence are interdependent, since the Symposium 
represents eros as a daimôn and Socrates as a daemonic individual. Finally, I will argue 
that the allocation of space within the dialogue, while it certainly testifies that this author 
attributes enormous importance to the daimonion, also speaks to the ongoing role of 
cooperative reasoning. These three arguments will allow me to conclude that according to 
the Theages, daemonic influence is actually part of successful human reasoning (and 
especially of philosophical reasoning). 
 The natural place to begin investigating daemonic influence in the Theages is in 
the existing scholarship on Socrates’ daimonion and Socratic rationality. What we will 
find here, unfortunately, is a way of reconciling revelation and reason which actually 
makes the conclusion of the Theages look less compatible with traditional Socratic 
inquiry. (This may not be incidental to the prevalent way of interpreting the Theages.) In 
his influential book on Socrates, Vlastos argues that in dreams sent from the gods, poetic 
enthusiasm, and daemonic signs divine intervention is temporally and 
phenomenologically separable from the activity of reasoning.44 For example, first 
Socrates experiences the daemonic sign or has a prophetic or admonitory dream, and 
afterwards he reasons out the meaning of the sign or the dream on the basis of his 
                                                
44 This is not the way Vlastos himself puts it, but it is clearly implied by 1991, 157-78 
and 280-2. The exception is what Brickhouse and Smith 2005, 44-9 aptly call Vlastos’ 
“reductionist” approach (referring to Vlastos 1991, 283-4). According to this the 
daemonic sign is simply a “subjective hunch” about the conclusion toward which the 
rational inquiry is moving. Variations on this interpretation appear frequently in the 
scholarship, for example in Villa’s reduction of the “inner voice” to “the thinking 
individual’s capacity to generate such prohibitions . . . not out of deference to such 
authorities but out of a nonexpert understanding of injustice” (2001, 41).  
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previously established beliefs and normal procedures of inference. Vlastos even goes so 
far as to argue that while the daemonic sign is occurring for Socrates, he is “out of his 
mind” (ἔκφρων) like the poets and rhapsodes Socrates describes in the Ion.45 McPherran 
and Brickhouse and Smith have persuasively criticized Vlastos’ attempt to “disarm the 
irrationalist potential of the belief in supernatural gods communicating with human 
beings by supernatural signs.”46 But notwithstanding their qualifications of his position, 
they and other scholars continue to assume that divine premonitions of all kinds are 
“information” upon which the critical intellect operates. Inasmuch as this scholarship 
focuses on the daemonic sign’s apotropaic activity, this makes fairly good sense. We can 
agree that Socrates typically experiences the daemonic sign as something foreign to 
himself, which he perceives, upon which he subsequently acts, and about which he 
reasons (e.g. Euthd. 272e1-4, Phdr. 242b8-c9, Ap. 31c4-d6 and 40a2-c4, Tht. 151a4-5).47 
But if we take this as our only model for the sort of divine influence which is compatible 
with Socratic philosophizing, then we will probably conclude that whatever is happening 
in the conclusion of the Theages is no longer Socratic philosophy. For nothing in the 
Theages suggests that when Socrates speaks of “the power of the daimonion assisting in 
the association” of some of his followers, he means that it intervenes with dreams or 
                                                
45 ibid. 167-71. The key sentence is Ion 534b3-6: κοῦφον γὰρ χρῆµα ποιητής ἐστιν καὶ 
πτηνὸν καὶ ἱερόν, καὶ οὐ πρότερον οἷός τε ποιεῖν πρὶν ἂν ἔνθεός τε γένηται καὶ 
ἔκφρων καὶ ὁ νοῦς µηκέτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνῇ. 
46 Quotation from Vlastos 1991, 170-1. McPherran 1996, 175-207; Brickhouse and Smith 
2005. The latter is particularly good at drawing attention to Vlastos’ partisan rhetoric, 
though others in the scholarly community continue to presume a collective duty to 
“disarm the irrationalist potential” of Socratic religiosity (e.g. Partridge 2008, 289: 
“Modern sensibilities bristle at the idea that Socrates adjusted his actions in response to 
strange signals received from a divine source” Whose modern sensibilities? Clearly those 
of the mainstream scholarly community. Compare the awareness of McPherran 1996, 11 
that his portrayal of Socratic religion may be “unpalatable” or “disconcerting.”) 
47 These references are conveniently listed by Vlastos 1991, 284-5. For clear-headed 
speculation about the phenomenal character of this “sign,” see Long 2006, 63-74. 
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apotropaic signs, which he and his followers subsequently incorporate into cooperative 
critical reasoning.48  
 However, this is not the only model for divine influence either in the ambient 
culture or in Plato’s dialogues. The distinction between divine intrusion and normal 
processes of perception and reasoning is not always so clear. In her recent book The 
Symptom and the Subject, Holmes addresses daemonic incursion into what she calls the 
“the domain of the felt.”49 The key point for my purposes is that the boundary between 
self and other, between “one’s own” normal phenomenal consciousness and foreign 
intrusions into it, is culturally negotiated and may be ambiguous. What constitutes an 
intrusion, i.e. what will be registered as foreign to the subject’s integrity, is determined by 
how she interprets her experience in the light of the phenomenological vocabulary 
available to her. With reference to Homer, Holmes focuses on the nearly untranslatable 
apparatus including thumos, êtor, kêr, kradiê, phrenes, prapides, menos, atê, noos and 
psuchê. For example, in Iliad 16 Glaucus knows that Apollo has heard his prayer not only 
because the god heals his wound, but because he “cast menos into his thumos” (16.528-
9). These words describe a sudden alteration in Glaucus’ phenomenal consciousness, 
which the hero will interpret as the trace of divine influence.50 In fact—to go beyond 
Holmes’ analysis—divine influence is often invoked even when the intrusion is too subtle 
to be picked out of the normal phenomenal field, provided that later evidence points to 
                                                
48 The anecdotes about Charmides, Timarchus, and Sannion should not be taken as 
evidence of apotropaic signs contributing to education (Thg. 128d8-29d8), since in their 
cases philosophical progress is not at issue.  
49 2010, esp. 41-83. 
50 Homer vouches for Apollo’s action with his authorial voice, but of course that voice is 
not audible to Glaucus. 
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something uncanny in the subject’s functioning. Hence when Homer’s Agamemnon 
finally returns Briseis to Achilles, he begins by saying,  
    I am not responsible,  
but Zeus, and Destiny, and a mist-walking Erinys,  
who in assembly cast savage atê into my phrenes  
on that day I myself took Achilles’ prize from him. (Il. 19.86-9).51  
 
Nothing in Iliad 1.101-87, where Homer narrates this incident, suggests a divinity has 
impinged on Agamemnon’s phrenes. Nevertheless, Agamemnon’s words are only partly 
in bad faith: certainly he manipulates religious beliefs in order to save face, but at the 
same time his decision looks so catastrophic in hindsight that it is easy to believe the 
gods, whose purposes impact all parts of the war,52 must somehow have been at work in 
this momentous error.53 Agamemnon offers a catalog of possible agents of this atê 
(“ruin” or “delusion”), but elsewhere such imperceptible intervention is often simply 
attributed to “some god” (θεός τις or θεῶν τις) or “a daimôn.”54 For example, at Iliad 
17.792-3 Nestor urges Patroclus to speak with Achilles: “Who knows whether, with 
daemonic help (σὺν δαίµονι), you might stir his thumos with your persuasion?” Nestor is 
not counting on some divinity making an epiphany, as Athena does to Achilles in Iliad 
1.188-222, or “tak[ing] away his phrenes,” as Zeus does to Glaucus in Iliad 6.234. The 
                                                
51 translation adapted from Lattimore 1951.   
52 Of course, the entire Iliad is “the plan of Zeus” (Διὸς βουλή, 1.5), and Homer depicts 
various gods both fighting and helping their favorites throughout the epic. 
53 Cf. Williams 1993, 52-5.  
54 On the invocation of a daimon where the speaker cannot specify any particular deity, 
see Nilsson 1967, 216-222; Burkert 1985, 179-81; Brenk 1986, 2071-82; Padel 1995, 
138-41; Holmes 2010, 52.  
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phrase “with daemonic help” tends rather to anticipate the ubiquitous but hidden or 
enigmatic involvement of divinities in the world.55   
 It may be objected that this is all very well for Homer, but Plato’s Socrates does 
not think of the visible world or human consciousness as domains in which divinities 
regularly act. Yet it is Socrates who advises Timaeus to “duly call upon the gods” before 
beginning his cosmogony (Tim. 27b8), which Timaeus accordingly does:   
Indeed, Socrates, everyone with even a little temperance shares the invocation of 
a god before the beginning of every undertaking, whether great or small. And we 
… must call on the gods and goddesses and pray that everything we say will be 
pleasing to them and agreeable to us. (27c1-d1)   
 
It may seem odd for Timaeus to mention “temperance” (σωφροσύνη) rather than 
wisdom or piety, for example; but it is by temperance that humans recognize their 
limitations and need for divine assistance. The form of assistance for which Timaeus 
prays, and which Socrates invokes elsewhere in the Platonic corpus, is of the enigmatic or 
even imperceptible kind I have just described in Homer. For example, near the beginning 
of the Philebus Socrates has already guided the comparison between pleasure and 
intelligence into deep metaphysical waters. When Protarchus declares his inability to 
proceed further, Socrates reassures him that “some god seems to have given me a 
recollection” that will further the discussion (20b3-4). Of course Socrates is being ironic; 
invoking divine intervention is entirely in keeping with his characteristic diffidence. But 
this does not mean he doubts that gods are (sometimes) responsible for thoughts that 
advance an inquiry. Slightly later, when he has sketched the first two metaphysical 
genera, he asks Protarchus to describe the third. “You’ll tell both of us, I think,” 
                                                
55 See the preceding note. Compare the phrase πρὸς δαίµονα, interpretations of which 
are canvassed by Brenk 1986, 2075-6.  
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Protarchus responds. “A god will tell us,” Socrates replies, “if any of the gods gives ear 
to my prayers.” “Pray then, and keep watch,” Protarchus answers. This “watching” 
(σκοπεῖν) is within Socrates’ power, but there is room for “any of the gods” (τις θεῶν) to 
affect whether a helpful thought or “recollection” (µνήµη) wells up before his mind’s 
eye. Compare Charmides 172e4-73a8, where Socrates implies that the thoughts which 
“appear” (προφαίνεσθαι) to him “after focusing his [mental] gaze” (ἀποβλέψας) are 
like a god-sent dream.56 As the conceptual machinery of phrenes, thumos, menos, atê and 
related words leave a Homeric hero some leeway to conjecture whether an experience 
testifies to foreign incursion, so does that of skopein, apoblepein, prophainesthai, mnêmê 
and their congeners. One can never be sure whether “some god” has had a subtle hand in 
the success or failure of an inquiry.  
 This lesson is communicated in several ways during the midwifery interlude of 
the Theaetetus.57 For example, after denying he possesses the wisdom to which his 
students give birth, Socrates nevertheless insists that “the god and I are responsible for 
the midwifery” (τῆς µέντοι µαιείας ὁ θεός τε καὶ ἐγὼ αἴτιος, 150d6-e1). In the previous 
section I emphasized Socrates’ expert guidance in “midwifery,” i.e., in the extraction and 
rational testing of beliefs. At this stage I would like to focus instead on the involvement 
                                                
56 “Listen to my dream,” he goes on, “whether it has come through the horns or through 
the ivory” (Chrm. 173a7-8). The reference is to Od. 19.560-7, where Penelope wonders 
whether her dream was sent through the gates of ivory, and so is false, or those of horn, 
and so is true. Compare also Resp. 432b7-c2, where Socrates compares the inquiry to a 
thicket and its solution to prey. He says he and Glaucon must περιίστασθαι 
προσέχοντας τὸν νοῦν, and urges Glaucon to ὅρα καὶ προθυµοῦ κατιδεῖν. On 
metaphors of seeing in Platonic philosophy in general, see Nightingale 2004. 
57 In addition to the examples discussed in this paragraph, note that at 150c7-8 Socrates 
says that the god forces him to be a midwife, but prevents him from begetting any 
wisdom himself; and at 151b4, he implies that it is “with god’s help” (σὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν; cf. 
Prt. 317b6-c1) that he successfully pairs young men he cannot help with other teachers.  
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of “the god,” who is said to share “responsibility” for the enterprise’s success. This union 
of human reasoning and divine inspiration has attracted surprisingly little attention from 
scholars,58 but the foregoing survey of modes of divine influence has put us in a position 
to conjecture what this co-responsibility involves: god enables the right thought to occur 
to Socrates and his interlocutor at the appropriate time, thus permitting their cooperative 
examination of the latter’s beliefs to make progress. 
  In fact Socrates optimistically anticipates divine help in the very inquiry which 
Theaetetus is undertaking. He asks Theaetetus to “try again from the beginning, 
Theaetetus, to say what understanding is. And never say you’re not able: if god is willing 
and you persevere manfully, you’ll be able” (Tht. 151d5-6). The word I have translated 
“persevere manfully” (ἀνδρίζῃ) is cognate with “manliness” (ἀνδρεία), which we often 
translate as “courage.” The intellectualist focus of Plato’s Laches, which attempts to 
define “courage” as a virtue, may lead us to forget that “manliness” also comprehends 
vigor, strength, and aggressiveness – in short, heroic qualities.59 Socrates is playing with 
the motif of “some god” assisting a hero, though in this instance there can be no question 
of charging into a melee. Theaetetus’ heroics will be intellectual; the god’s benevolence 
will affect his ability to sustain and succeed in recollection, investigation, or intuition.60  
                                                
58 Cf. Joyal 2000, 87: “to account for this otherwise inexplicable efficacy of ἔλεγχος and 
for the fact that some people make progress while others do not, Plato employed the 
notion of divine intervention.” While Joyal suspends judgment regarding “whether or not 
Plato is to be taken au pied de la lettre,” I am suggesting the author of the Theages takes 
him literally. See also Burnyeat 1977, 13, who compares the marriage of inspiration and 
reasoning in the midwifery passage with Phdr. 249b ff.  
59 Homer uses ἀγηνορίη (from ἀγα-, “very,” + ἀνήρ) rather than ἀνδρεία. On its 
meaning, see Clarke 2004, 74-86.  
60 On Socratic philosophy as heroism, see Eisner 1982; Seeskin 1987, 72-95; Hobbs 
2000. 
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 This brings us back to daemonic intervention in the Theages. As we saw in 
section 1, Socrates claims that “the power of this daimonion also has almighty influence 
over my associations with those who pass time with me” (129e1-3); and, “whomever the 
power of the daimonion has assisted in their association [with me], these are the ones 
you’ve noticed, for they make progress immediately” (129e7-9). As we also saw, 
Socrates has adapted the second of these sentences from the Theaetetus, substituting “the 
daimonion” for “the god.” It is worth juxtaposing these sentences schematically, so that 
their parallelism becomes graphically obvious: 
  
Whomever the power of the daimonion has 
assisted in their association [with me], 
All whom the god permits 
these are the ones you’ve noticed, for they make 
progress immediately (Thg. 129e7-9). 
make wonderful progress as our 
association continues, as both they and others 
believe (Tht. 150d3-6) 
 
Part of the phrase “All whom the god permits” (πάντες … οἷσπερ ἂν ὁ θεὸς παρείκῃ) is 
reiterated later in the Theages, again with the god replaced by the daimonion. Theages 
says, “What I think we should do, Socrates, is test this daimonion by being together, and 
if it permits (ἐὰν µὲν παρείκῃ), so much the better” (Thg. 131a1-3). Finally, Socrates 
shifts without comment from “the daimonion” to “the god” at the end of the dialogue: “If 
the god so pleases (ἐὰν µὲν τῷ θεῷ φίλον ᾖ) , you’ll make a lot of progress quickly” 
(Thg. 130e5-6). This conflation of god and daimonion in allusions to the Theaetetus is 
important for our understanding of divine intervention in the Theages. It frees the 
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daimonion from its merely apotropaic role and permits it to appropriate the more 
expansive and subtle interventions of the god in the Theaetetus. That god does not 
compromise human reasoning, but rather helps those he favors—Socrates and (some of) 
Socrates’ interlocutors—to reason successfully. In the same way I suggest that the “the 
almighty influence” of the daimonion-god in the Theages does not replace dialectic, but 
rather oversee its results.   
 There are at least two additional considerations which corroborate this reading of 
daemonic intervention in the Theages. The first concerns the interdependence of erotics 
and daemonic agency. At Symposium 202d7-203a8 Diotima explains to Socrates that 
Eros is neither a god nor a mortal, but a being “between mortal and immortal”: a “great 
daimôn” (202a11-13). The function of daimones is said to be communication between 
gods and humans (202e3-203a4; cf. 188b6-d2). Joyal rightly emphasizes the pertinence 
of this text to the fusion of eroticism and daemonology in the Theages,61 but does not 
bring out its consequences for the question of rationality. The Eros of the Symposium is a 
daemonic intermediary because He presides over the impulse of our unified erotic drive 
to bring mortal beings into association with eternal Forms and friendship with god. 
Socrates resembles this daemonic intermediary (both are poor, barefoot, always in search 
and need of wisdom, etc.) precisely because he shares His characteristic activity: he 
guides those who love him toward better understanding and more effective satisfaction of 
their drive to be with and give birth in Beauty. This Socratic capacity is also 
                                                
61 2000, 97. However, Joyal goes slightly too far in asserting that the Theages’ daimonion 
simply is the daimôn Eros of the Symposium. Clearly Eros must preside over every erotic 
relationship, while Socrates’ daimonion presides over very few. We should say instead 
that the Theages’ daimonion, which is a singular entity, exercises the function of the 
Symposium’s Eros, which is a mythical generalization. 
 
38 
communicated by the language of initiation in the ascent passage, which is borrowed 
from the Eleusinian and Bacchic mysteries.62 These are the elements which justify the 
inference that Socrates is a “daemonic man” (δαιµόνιος ἀνήρ, Smp. 203a5).63 Thus the 
daemonic thing about Socrates is not any magico-religious power to transmit learning by 
sheer bodily contact, but rather his involvement in the erotic impulse to transcend our 
mortal nature. This impulse is most fully satisfied through cooperative rational inquiry. It 
is only a small step from here to saying that the function of Socrates’ daimonion in the 
Theages is to preside over this “daemonic” philosophical enterprise.  
 The second corroborating consideration for this view of daemonic influence 
concerns the allocation of space in the Theages. On the one hand it could be argued that 
the sheer amount of time spent on Socrates’ daimonion (128d5-30e4, approximately 2.5 
Stephanus pages) conveys an adulatory fascination inconsistent with commitment to 
sober reasoning. Joyal notes that the series of anecdotes which precedes Aristides’ report 
provide only tangential support to Socrates’ argument, since they have nothing to do with 
education.64 We can add that these tangential anecdotes form a dramatic crescendo, 
beginning with Charmides’ mishap at Nemea, amplified in Timarchus’ assassination 
attempt and death, and concluding with two examples involving mass loss of life: first, a 
passing claim that Socrates predicted the spectacular military disaster in Sicily, and 
second, a prediction that Sannio’s current expedition will meet a similarly bad end. We 
                                                
62 µύησις and ἐπόπτεια, the two stages of the Eleusinian mysteries, appear as µυηθείης 
and ἐποπτικά at Smp. 210a1. For deeper correspondences, see Nightingale 2004, 83-93. 
On Bacchic mystery elements, see Morgan 1990, 93-9.  
63 Cf. Morgan 1990, 83; Bussanich 2006, 208. Also relevant here is the so-called 
“shamanic” paradigm for ancient philosophy, as Morgan 1990, 97 and Bussanich 2006, 
210 both remark. On ancient philosophy and shamanism, see especially Burkert 1972, 
Kingsley, 1995. 
64 2000, 51.  
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have no independent evidence about any of these events except the Sicilian expedition, 
but we should assume that the nature of Charmides’ misfortune was known to our 
author’s audience, and that Sannio’s campaign did indeed end badly.65 The anecdotes 
thus provide little information about the sign’s relevance to education, but convey with 
tragic finality the weightiness of the daimonion’s intervention in other circumstances. All 
of this certainly amplifies the prominence of the daimonion beyond anything seen in 
other Platonic dialogues. 
 However, our author’s lavish treatment of the daimonion need not compromise 
the integrity of critical reasoning. First, it should be noted that these anecdotes are not 
irrelevant to Socrates’ persuasive aim here: they contribute to his goal of tempering 
Theages’ unreflective enthusiasm, since they document the reality of this unpredictable 
educational force. They also communicate a warning about its fallibility: like the 
mythical prophets Cassandra and Tiresias, in all four of these examples it speaks in vain. 
Moreover, while a lot of room is devoted to Socrates’ description of the daimonion, 
significantly more is devoted to the dialectical exchange between Socrates and Theages 
(122e1-27b1, approximately 4.25 Stephanus pages). This dialectical exchange is essential 
to Socrates’ pedagogical aim. Theages comes to Socrates asking for someone to make 
him “wise,” and hoping in this fashion to advance in politics. The questions Socrates 
directs at Theages encourage him to reflect more carefully on the complex relationship 
between the “wisdom” he is pursuing, which possesses a dangerously vague appeal, and 
Theages’ personal goals of becoming “better”  in general and politically influential in 
                                                
65 See the commentaries of Joyal 2000 and Bailly 2004.  
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particular.66 Not only do Socrates’ questions challenge Theages to think about the 
teachable content of personal and political wisdom, but they also dramatically exemplify 
how a master of dialectic can frustrate an inexperienced interlocutor. This lesson blends 
naturally into Socrates’ questions about finding an appropriate teacher. Thus the 
dialectical component of the Theages raises questions which anticipate subsequent 
reconsideration in greater detail. What is wisdom? How is it related to goodness? How is 
either related to politics? How can these things be taught? These questions suggest a 
curriculum for Theages’ future conversations with Socrates. If daemonic influence made 
this further thinking unnecessary, it would simultaneously threaten to make the first two-
thirds of this dialogue superfluous. On the other hand, if we accept that this author 
attributes importance both to cooperative reasoning and to daemonic influence, then we 
will be able to appreciate how all parts of the dialogue serve his purposes.  
 In this section I have attempted to dispel the second accusation leveled at the 
conclusion of the Theages, which is that the role it attributes to Socrates’ daimonion 
renders human reasoning superfluous. I have argued that the ambient culture, Plato’s 
dialogues in general, and the Theaetetus and Symposium in particular provide us with 
increasingly specific clues for understanding how daemonic intervention cooperates with 
human reasoning. This reading not only follows the signposts established by our author’s 
allusions, it also allows us to make better sense of the dialogue as a whole. I am thus in a 
position at last to offer an interpretation of Socrates’ claim that limitation of his 
knowledge to erotics and the intervention of this amalgamated divine agency amounts to 
the predominance of “chance” in his associates’ educational progress. 
                                                
66 Joyal 2000, 40. Pangle 1987, 52-8 offers a thought-provoking reading of the political 
aspects of Socrates’ interrogation of Theages.   
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4. Interim Conclusion: Taking Your Chances with Socrates 
 If my interpretation of eros and daemonic influence in the Theages is correct, it 
should be possible to offer an interpretation of the end of the dialogue which is in 
harmony with it. This, we remember, is Socrates’ conclusion: 
So that’s what association with me is like. If the god so pleases, you’ll make a lot 
of progress quickly. If not, you won’t. So consider whether it isn’t safer for you to 
be educated by someone who’s in control of the benefit he can offer, rather than 
to take your chances with me. 
 
It should now be obvious that I believe Socrates’ first sentence is slightly ironic: “So 
that’s what association with me is like.” We must remember that Socrates’ intention is 
not only to exemplify how eros and the daimonion function in his educational 
relationships, but also to shake up Theages’ faith that his progress lies entirely in 
Socrates’ volition. It is therefore not coincidental that he chooses the examples of 
Aristides, who failed to make any lasting progress, and Thucydides, who (at the time of 
the anecdote) is finding Socratic education very uncomfortable. Socrates wants Theages, 
and our author wants his readers, to reflect critically on these difficulties. Theages will 
require further conversations with Socrates to understand what went wrong with 
Aristides, but the dialogue’s original readers could consult Plato’s dialogues, to which 
our author emphatically alludes, and the pedagogical activity going on all around them in 
the Old Academy. They would then come to realize both that daemonic influence is 
essential for progress and that that this influence is inseparable from active engagement 
in ethical reflection.   
 This is by no means to deny that Socrates’ daemonic power takes on an entirely 
new importance in the Theages. Socrates is not only saying that the success or failure of 
his companions depends on the gods, which would be a rather conventional piety. He is 
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stipulating that it depends on his own tutelary divinity, which is particularly concerned 
with the philosophical progress of his friends. Yet this divinity does not simply transmit 
understanding into the souls of those friends through visual or bodily contact. It 
invigorates their own intellectual efforts, which Socrates directs with “understanding” 
and “learning.” The distinction Socrates draws between “taking your chances with me” 
and learning with “someone who is in control of the benefit he offers” is thus a complex 
one. It is not a matter of either learning doctrines from a sophist or cuddling with 
Socrates, waiting for an epiphany. Rather, the distinction begins with a familiar one from 
other dialogues: unlike the sophists, Socrates disclaims knowledge, and therefore cannot 
teach any doctrines. His role is to elicit his interlocutor’s beliefs, examine them critically, 
and help them evolve toward a better understanding of Beauty and Goodness. This 
already introduces an element of uncertainty in Socratic education, since Socrates does 
not possess the truth himself; he must wait to see whether the mental offspring of his 
companions are “genuine and true” or “fantasms and falsehoods.” This uncertainty is 
heightened through the involvement of the divinity, who permits some companions to 
succeed in this endeavor but not others. This is what Socrates means by saying Theages 
must “take his chances with me”: with a sophist like Prodicus Theages is sure to learn 
some doctrines, but with Socrates he can come away with nothing, either because his 
mental offspring are worthless, or because the divinity has not helped him to nourish 
them. Yet the key point for us is that his education will remain a rational one: the only 
way to discover whether his offspring have any value or the divinity is willing to help is 
to engage in dialectic with Socrates and hope for the best.67   
                                                
67 Possibly we should also read “take your chances” with the understanding that “chance” 
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 It may be asked whether Theages himself shows any understanding of this lesson.  
It would not be a decisive objection to my interpretation if he did not, since Theages’ 
failure to pick up on Socrates’ hints would not prevent readers of the dialogue from doing 
so. But I would like to suggest that Theages has at least an inkling of Socrates’ meaning – 
as much as we should expect in the first moments of what will be an enduring 
relationship.  
 In order to detect this possibility, it is important to remember that the first few 
pages of the dialogue have prepared Theages to approach Socrates’ statements as a kind 
of verbal game. After politely answering Socrates’ questions for several pages, Theages 
exclaims, “For some time now, Socrates, you’ve been making fun of me and playing 
around with me” (125e4). We also saw that he had the same reaction to Socrates’ 
declaration of ignorance: “He’s playing around with us when he says this” (128c1). Here 
Theages clearly implies that Socrates is speaking ironically: Socrates does not mean what 
he initially appears to mean. Theages’ outbursts aim to cut through this irony and 
encourage Socrates to speak “seriously.” But since Socrates remains as evasive as ever, 
and Theages’ enthusiasm for studying with him remains undiminished, in his final words 
Theages surrenders his demand for plain speech and joins Socrates’ ironic game. He 
suggests they “test this daimonion by being together,” and if necessary, “deliberate about 
what we should do,” possibly including “persuad[ing] this divine thing that happens to 
you with prayers and sacrifices and whatever else the prophets suggest” (130e5-31a7). 
                                                                                                                                            
(tuchê) denotes the providential will of the deity, not random events. See McPherran 
2005 on eutuchia in the Euthydemus.    
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There is no need to assume that Theages means these words absolutely at face value.68 He 
simply accepts the verbal handles Socrates supplies by representing philosophical 
progress in terms of daemonic influence. The self-consciousness with which he does so is 
indicated by his conspicuous use of an ionic dative, which casts the phrase “with prayers 
and sacrifices” into the heroic meter of Greek epic poetry: εὐχαῖσί τε καὶ θυσίαις.69 This 
communicates to Socrates both his enthusiasm and his awareness that they are not 
speaking in a transparent, everyday idiom. Theages senses that these anecdotes have an 
informational or psychagogic content he cannot yet perceive. He wants to show Socrates 
that he is willing to collaborate with him in order to reveal this content and learn how to 
learn. That is why all the verbs in his final sentence are in the first person plural. 
Whatever precisely Socrates means by talking about this daemonic thing, Theages is 
ready not only to submit to its inscrutable influence, but also to engage with it actively on 
whatever level turns out to be possible. Of course, this active engagement will turn out to 
be Socratic dialectic.  
5. The Academy of Polemo and Crates 
 I have now completed my interpretation of the Theages. However, at the outset of 
this interpretation I suggested that it is unlikely our author both knows Plato’s dialogues 
well (as he obviously does) and presents us with a Socrates who replaces dialectic with 
tactile magic. Yet in a recent article Harold Tarrant suggests that the Theages was written 
in the Academy of Polemo and Crates (ca. 314-260 BCE), which 
                                                
68 As Vlastos 1991, 282 does. Cobb 1992, 278; Joyal 2000, 293-4; and Bailly 2004, 264 
suggests that Socrates would never speak of worshiping the daimonion in this way, but 
none of these scholars questions whether Theages is in earnest.   
69 First noted by Friedländer 1965, 329, followed by Joyal 2000, 293 and Bailly 2004, 
264. The meter could also be anapaestic, but in any event is markedly poetic.  
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might have been promoting an education in which physical proximity was 
idealised, progress (and even entry) was controlled by daimonic forces beyond the 
teacher’s control, Socratic erôs was a major catalyst, conventional teaching and 
learning were not decisive, and dialectic was all but forgotten as a means of moral 
improvement.70  
 
If this were taken to mean that touching and loving began to replace cooperative critical 
inquiry, it could undermine part of my argument. As I said in my introduction, I consider 
Tarrant’s ascription of the Theages to an author in this period plausible, and have no 
intention of addressing the full range of arguments he brings to bear. With regard to the 
foregoing quotation in particular, I readily grant the importance of erotics and physical 
proximity under Polemo and Crates. There is also (more limited) evidence for Tarrant’s 
thought-provoking suggestion that scholarchs of the Academy in this period represented 
themselves as “divinely inspired individual[s]” like Socrates.71 The point I wish to query 
is Tarrant’s claim that “dialectic was all but forgotten as a means of moral improvement” 
under Polemo and Crates. This, I will argue, is far from proven by the evidence.  
 I shall proceed from daemonic influence via erotics to dialectic. Tarrant’s case 
that under Polemo and Crates “progress (and even entry [to the Academy]) was 
controlled by daimonic forces beyond the teacher’s control” comes down to a single 
anecdote and some verses from Antagoras’ epitaph for these two scholarchs.72 Here are 
the verses from Antagoras and both versions of the anecdote, which probably goes back 
to Antigonus of Carystus:  
Stranger, as you pass by say that god-like Crates and Polemo 
are hidden by this memorial, 
men concordant in their mighty spirits, from whose daemonic mouth[s] 
                                                
70 2005, 142. 
71 Tarrant 2005, 144.  
72 Tarrant 2005, 144 cites the quotations from Antagoras and Diogenes Laertius below, 
but not Philodemus’ version.   
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a holy discourse rushed forth . . . (Antagoras in D.L. 4.21) 
 
Arcesilaus, who went over from Theophrastus to Polemo and Crates, says that 
they were gods or remnants of the golden race. (D.L. 4.22). 
 
Arcesilaus said that when he went over from Theophrastus those around Polemo 
appeared to him as gods or remnants of those ancient people molded from the 
golden race . . . (Philodemus, Academica 15.3-14) 73    
 
Clearly Arcesilaus’ comment could testify to his belief that Polemo and Crates were, like 
Socrates, especially daemonic figures. Among the qualities of the Hesiodic “golden race” 
to which Arcesilaus alludes is that they were “friends of the blessed gods” (Hes. Erg. 
120). Although Antagoras’ relation to the Academy is unclear,74 his description of both 
men as “godlike” (θουδέα) and of their mouths as “daemonic” (δαιµονίου στόµατος) 
could also speak to these men’s semi-divine status within the school. However, these 
worshipful attitudes do not specifically suggest that Polemo and Crates determined entry 
to the Academy by daemonic signs or communicated progress by tactile transmission. 
When Arcesilaus alludes to Hesiod he is probably thinking also of Polemo’s renowned 
imperturbability (D.L. 4.17, Phil. Acad. 13.11-41), since the golden race “lived like gods 
with carefree minds, free from suffering and distress” (Erg. 112-3). Indeed, the 
uniformity of Polemo’s composure—exemplified by his impassivity when bitten by a 
dog—approaches Socrates’ “daemonic” imperviousness to cold, alcohol, fear and fatigue. 
Moreover, the affectionate unanimity between Polemo and Crates again recalls the 
golden race, who “willingly and peacefully shared out their works along with many good 
things” (Hes. Erg. 118-9). In short, there are many grounds for calling these scholarchs 
                                                
73 I use the text of Gaiser 1988. The sentence I have quoted goes on for 3 more lines in 
the papyrus, but these are so lacunose, and Gaiser’s reconstruction so conjectural, that 
they do not bear reprinting here.  
74 See Gow and Page 1965, vol. 2 pp. 29-30.  
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“godlike” and “remnants of the golden race” without implying that daemonic forces had 
begun to displace reasoning in their teaching. 
 The evidence for erotic education under Polemo and Crates is equally inexact. It 
is clear that Polemo, Crates, Crantor and the young Arcesilaus placed unusual emphasis 
on collective living and affectionate relationships. For example, Diogenes tells us that 
Polemo and Crates “loved each other (ἐφιλείτην) so zealously that they not only shared 
their activities in living, but almost even resembled each other in expiring, and when they 
were dead shared the same tomb” (D.L. 4.21).75 Moreover, Tarrant is surely right that 
“they learnt by the example of their teacher.”76 Polemo emulated (ἐζηλωκέναι) 
Xenocrates and therefore “put on (ἐνεδέδυτο) the man’s openness, austerity, and gravity” 
(D.L. 4.19); and we have just seen that Crates and Polemo shared every aspect of their 
lives. But admiration and imitation are normal elements of philosophical conversion 
narratives. In fact, the verb “emulate” (ζηλόω) and the noun “emulator” (ζηλωτής) are 
regular terms for students’ relationship with teachers (e.g. D.L. 2.56, 4.32-3, 4.36, 6.3, 
8.55-6). This emulation is philosophical inasmuch as the initial impression made by the 
fascinating teacher is subjected to rational analysis.77 In practice it seems that many 
would-be philosophers failed to move past slavish imitation to critical appropriation.78 
But even if Polemo were one of these, that would not mean that the Academy approved 
in theory of education by proximity and role-modeling without rational corroboration.     
                                                
75 Other anecdotes repeatedly address eros. See esp. D.L. 4.19-22 and Philodemus, 
Academica 13.10-11, 14.37-45, 15.31-46 with Tarrant 2005, 143 and Kulevski 1984, 18-
25. While one must be extremely wary of anecdotes about ancient philosophers, the 
evidence here is consistent and abundant enough to carry weight.  
76 2005, 143, italics in the original. 
77 Hadot 2002, 29-32.  
78 I have discussed representations of this problem in Socratic literature at Lampe 2010, 
199-206.  
 
48 
 Nor is Polemo’s recorded definition of eros as damning as Tarrant implies: 
“Polemo used to say that eros is service to the gods for the care <and salvation> of the 
young [θεῶν ὑπηρεσίαν εἰς νέων ἐπιµέλειαν ⟨καὶ σωτηρίαν⟩]” (Plut. Mor. 780d). Once 
again Tarrant is probably right that Polemo intends to correct Pausanias’ ideal of eros in 
the Symposium (esp. 184d5), where eros involves “serving” (ὑπηρετεῖν) the beloved. For 
Polemo it is the god, not the beloved, who receives service.79 But this is consistent with 
the lover and beloved reasoning together, which amounts to “care and salvation” for the 
latter. Vlastos has convincingly shown that the Euthyphro and Apology support an 
understanding of Socratic piety as “service to god” (ὑπηρετική τις . . . θεοῖς, Euthphr. 
13d7; τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν, Ap. 23c1; τὴν ἐµὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν, Ap. 30a6-7).80 
Since god wants what is best for humans, “service to god” means helping others to 
recognize what is truly good through elenctic inquiry.81 Even if Polemo and Crates have 
abandoned Socrates’ strong emphasis on revealing their own ignorance to his 
interlocutors their own ignorance, their form of “service to the gods” probably still 
involves cooperative reasoning with their young students in order to help them realize 
what is truly good.   
 This brings us to dialectic. Tarrant asserts that “Polemo is well known for his 
insistence that practical ethics has no need for a dialectical foundation.”82 Once again, the 
evidence is scarce and far from clear. There is one key report, which again probably goes 
back to Antigonus of Carystus, and comes to us in two variations: 
                                                
79 Tarrant 2005, 144. 
80 Cited by Vlastos 1991, 174-5 n. 85 and 91. 
81 1991, 174-6. 
82 2004, 142.  
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Polemo always used to say that we ought to exercise in deeds and not in 
dialectical investigations, as if we had greedily consumed some little manual of 
harmonics but never practiced, so that we’re admired for answering questions, but 
divided in our own character. (D.L. 2.18) 
 
He used to be annoyed with people who reduce questions to impossibilities, since 
he thought we should exercise in deeds. Therefore he was without barbarisms in 
his handling of positions and avoided every sort of witticism and, as one might 
say, was a Pindaric celebrant of harmony. (Phil. Acad. 14.3-12)     
 
The report in Diogenes that “we ought to exercise in deeds and not in dialectical 
investigations” (δεῖν ἐν τοῖς πράγµασι γυµνάζεσθαι καὶ µὴ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς 
θεωρήµασι) could indeed be taken to suggest that Polemo advises refraining from 
cooperative rational inquiry into ethics. We might imagine, for example, that he simply 
advises his students to model themselves on the leaders of the Academy. This role-
modeling could be energized through eros and informed by a certain amount of dogmatic 
instruction.  
 However, further details in our sources suggest a different way of interpreting 
Polemo’s meaning. First, in Diogenes’ testimony Polemo compares the use of dialectic he 
opposes to that of an aspiring musician who devours a manual but never picks up an 
instrument. Polemo is surely not suggesting that someone will make beautiful music by 
picking up a lyre and simply imitating a lyre-player. The problem is rather one of 
emphasis: like a would-be lyre-player who is fascinated by theories of harmony but never 
practices, a would-be philosopher who is fascinated by ethical arguments but never 
applies them will make little progress. Hence Sedley describes this passage as “an 
eloquent plea that practical ethics should not be reduced to dialectical argument.”83 
Polemo is not eliminating dialectic so much as objecting to its overemphasis. His 
                                                
83 1999, 146.  
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opponents here may include not only his one-time student Zeno of Citium, as Sedley 
convincingly argues, but Polemo’s renowned contemporaries (and competitors for Zeno’s 
tutelage), Stilpo the Megarian and Diodorus Cronus the Dialectician.     
 Philodemus’ testimony is slightly harder to interpret, both because the papyrus is 
lacunose and because his explanation for Polemo’s stance is unclear. But it seems 
compatible with the reading I have just offered. Philodemus begins by saying that Polemo 
“used to be annoyed with people who reduce questions to impossibilities” 
([ἐ]δυσ⟨χ⟩έραινε δὲ κα[ὶ] τοῖς̣ εἰς [ἀδυ]ν̣α̣τ̣᾿ ἀνάγουσι τὰς ἐρωτήσεις). Although the 
word “impossibilities” is conjectural, it is clear that Polemo objects specifically to people 
“reducing” or “leading” (ἀνάγουσι) questions in some undesirable direction. We could 
flesh this out in at least three ways. The first would involve the logical paradoxes for 
which the Megarians and Dialecticians were well known. Polemo could be arguing that 
these paradoxes channel mental effort in a direction that has no positive impact on ethical 
character. The second and third would reiterate what Diogenes Laertius has already told 
us. On the one hand, Polemo could be objecting to Zeno’s systematizing approach to 
“appropriate actions” (καθήκοντα), which he considers arid and pedagogically 
ineffective.84 On the other, Polemo could be criticizing overemphasis on the aporetic 
discussions of some Platonic dialogues. This could be what Polemo’s avoidance of 
“every witticism” (παντὸς . . . ἀστει[σµο]ῦ) hints at: in particular, Polemo may be 
avoiding Socrates’ ironic wit and his associated tendency to insist on his own 
ignorance.85  
                                                
84 Sedley 1999, 146-7. 
85 One of the meanings for ἀστεισµός LSJ offers (apparently with reference to this 
specific passage) is “ironic self-depreciation, mock-modesty.”  
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 None of these interpretations of Philodemus’ testimony would impute to Polemo 
complete avoidance of dialectical reasoning. The first would simply be an objection to 
ethically useless arguments. The second, as I have already stated, would be an objection 
to over-investment in ethical arguments as a distraction from practical exercises. The 
third would be an objection to arguments that dissolve conceit without replacing it with 
the teacher’s own healthier beliefs. Although Polemo discouraged attempts to systematize 
ethics, he almost certainly held strong opinions about its broad framework. Indeed, 
scholars have recently argued that Polemo had substantial influence on Zeno’s Stoic 
ethics and theology.86 There is no reason to doubt that Polemo’s students were 
encouraged to apply their own intellects in order to liberate themselves from their 
acculturated prejudices before learning this new ethical framework.  
 The upshot of all these arguments is that we have no good reason to believe that 
under Polemo and Crates critical reasoning had been replaced by erotic and daemonic 
influence. Clearly both erotics and other forms of affection and intimacy had become 
extremely important. It is also possible that the leaders of the Academy were representing 
themselves as Socrates’ daemonic successors. But nothing we are told about either eros 
or the godlike nature of these scholarchs suggests that cooperative reasoning was being 
supplanted. We might be tempted to read this into the evidence if we presumed that either 
erotics or daemonic influence were generally incompatible with reasoning. But I have 
argued that these three are compatible in both Greek literature generally and Plato’s 
dialogues in particular. We are therefore left with a Polemonian Academy in which 
erotics, reasoning, and possibly daemonic influence were allowed to intertwine without 
                                                
86 Sedley 2002, 41-83; Dillon 2003, 159-77. 
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any feeling that their integrity was being damaged. Thus education in the Academy of 
this period does not undercut my arguments about the Theages. Rather, I suggest that we 
revise our understanding of education under Polemo and Crates along the same lines as I 
have laid out for the Theages.   
6. Conclusion 
 If I am correct that the Theages is intended to initiate reflection about the various 
components of education, then it is not surprising it has always provoked a certain 
amount of puzzlement. Part of its aim is to begin discussions that will be taken up again 
later in the educational process, probably with the help of other dialogues. It is also 
unsurprising that its emphasis on the frailty of mortal reasoning and the need for divine 
assistance perturbs many readers. Socrates’ daimonion and general religiosity in other 
Platonic dialogues have also created intense controversies among modern scholars 
committed to the independence of human reasoning. But if we allow ourselves to 
supplement the Theages’ elliptical suggestions with the dialogues to which it alludes, we 
can see that its lesson is by no means outlandish for a fourth-century reader of Plato. Its 
author believes both in cooperative reasoning and in the ubiquitous and substantial 
influence of daemonic/divine forces. It is true that he puts more emphasis on the 
daemonic than any of Plato’s uncontroversially authentic dialogues. However, his 
original audience could readily use Plato’s own dialogues to explain how daemonic 
intervention and reasoning both contribute to philosophizing without impeding one 
another. Moreover, they would have the enormous advantage of contextualizing their 
discussions against the practical backdrop of teaching within the Academy. However 
“superstitious” this may appear to some modern readers, it is safest to allow that in the 
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Theages reasoning about ethics coexists harmoniously not only with an emphasis on its 
emotional contexts, but also with profound belief in the need for divine assistance.87  
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